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“An Inevitably Mediocre Bureaucracy”
By A. C. Littleton

I have been of the opinion that sound legal principles have been
developed out of long debate, and that the accepted principles of
economic theory have been tried in the fire of controversy. On
that basis, and since the impression persists that accounting
writers have been exceptionally considerate of each other’s opin
ions, I have thought that accounting literature would benefit from
more arguments.
Well, the man who puts his neck out ought not to be surprised
if . . .
Because of the novelty of the ideas sketched in the article in the
April number of The Journal of Accountancy on “Auditor
Independence,” the proposals not only are open to criticism but
they deserve plenty of it. I hope Dr. Hunt’s contribution is
merely the beginning, for after all the question is as broad as the
welfare of the profession; and after the criticisms constructive
suggestions will no doubt follow.
Dr. Hunt makes two principal points: first, that my views of
English practice are mistaken, and, second, that my proposals, if
adopted, would “bind accountancy in fetters of an inevitably
mediocre bureaucracy.”
In regard to the first, which is the point given most emphasis
by the critic, the answer is direct and simple. As an inland
provincial I would not be so bold as to claim direct personal
knowledge of British audit practice, nor would I maintain that I
had made any consistent study of recent developments in com
pany law. In these matters I have drawn upon secondary
sources, especially Miller and Campbell, Financial Democracy.
If their impression was in error that British investors were not
entirely convinced of the auditor’s complete independence, and if
they were mistaken in their belief that British court decisions had
circumscribed the theory of the auditor’s duty, I am sure they,
like all reputable authors, would appreciate being set aright.
But I wonder if Dr. Hunt’s discussion would convince them. In
fact, by a close reading, his quotations and arguments could
probably be turned back against him and in support of the joint
authors’ contentions.
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With that matter, however, I am little concerned, being, as it
were, just an innocent bystander within the line of fire. But the
second criticism, the one so dramatically phrased, brings me up
a-standing, one might say, for I want no part in binding fetters
upon anyone—or anything. That is why I would never run for
county sheriff. And “inevitably” is such a certainty in this
uncertain world of change that it would quite undermine my
whole philosophy if I accepted it. As for “mediocre bureau
cracy”—well, that is what I want to discuss.
It looks as if the word “licence” were more of a hobgoblin than
I had realized. Maybe it was an unfortunate choice; but nothing
more was intended than to suggest a formal listing of professional
accountants who had satisfied the proposed board of review or
accountancy court of their qualification to certify under the
securities and exchange acts, very much as attorneys are admitted
to practice before the courts, with the possibility of subsequent
disbarment for cause.
The word “licence” somehow tends to merge into “regimenta
tion,” and that, I judge by the newspapers, is practically a fight
ing word in some places. Thus the hobgoblin word becomes
a bugaboo word. But really the cry of “regimentation” is
already quite passé. We are rapidly losing our jumpiness
when it bobs up. I think the reason is the simple one that
the conviction is growing in most of us—especially since the
United States supreme court’s decision in the Schechter case—
that the American people possess a profound unwillingness to
be regimented.
If I lacked faith in this characteristic of Americans, or if I were
closer to Washington, perhaps I would not be so complacent in the
face of such words as licence, regimentation, bureaucracy. But,
as it is, I can not raise much temperature about them.
Now as to whether or not the proposed accounting board of
review must be a “mediocre bureaucracy.”
Dr. Hunt doubts that such a board or court could draw to its
service a personnel of the highest professional calibre. If it is a
fair question, I would like to ask, Why not? Would it be because
the profession contains no one willing to devote a span of years to
public service? Because there is none who could financially
afford to retire from practice? Because among accountants there
are too few men who are capable of facing questions of considera
ble import with good sense and sound judgment? Because pro
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fessional accountants lack the judicial temperament necessary to
impartial, unbiased decisions?
My critic offers no such explanations of his position as these
questions imply. But if he wishes to maintain his point about
“mediocrity” he will need to face such questions. If he wishes
to avoid creating the impression that he holds an extremely low
opinion regarding the quality of the profession’s top-man per
sonnel, he will need a clearer statement of his position.
The good doctor is distressed by the spectre of political inter
ference. He writes: “Is it presumptuous to inquire what there is
in the past experience of our country, or in the visible future,
which would guarantee that appointments to (or under) such a
commission would be free from political interference . . .?”
What is there in the proposal as outlined to suggest that the
accountancy court would be a short-lived “commission” staffed
by expedient, political appointments? Was it the method of
nominating possible appointees? Was it the suggested source of
the personnel? Or was it the attempt to place the members of
this court beyond economic pressure and threat of removal that
was objectionable?
The proposed source of the court’s personnel was a list of men—
“the best that the accountancy profession could produce of broad
education, varied experience and judicial temperament”—nomi
nated by the accountants’ national organizations. No better
source is suggested by the critic. If a better plan is offered than
appointment by the president of the United States, it would be
easy to consider it on its merits. If long appointments, generous
salaries and substantial retirement pensions will not help to make
the members of the court truly independent, some other devices
for accomplishing that objective might be proposed. But I
confess that is the best I can think up.
Perhaps the flaw of the plan lies in the conditions proposed for
granting individual accountants the privilege of practising under
the accountancy court. But why would it be objectionable to
require that statements for investors’ guidance shall be prepared
and certified by men who are qualified for this type of work “as
indicated by their education, experience, state certificate and
professional connections”? None of these elements would be
hard to determine and not one of them, surely, is an unreasonable
qualification. If membership in a professional body is a burden
some condition precedent, no great harm would be done by drop
266

An Inevitably Mediocre Bureaucracy"
ping it. But what good its omission would accomplish needs an
explanation from whosoever would advocate dropping that pro
vision. The same could be said about an oath to “disclose the
full facts clearly and express his professional opinion fearlessly in
behalf of all parties at interest.”
Perhaps those who could not qualify under these three simple
tests can be prevailed upon to enter the discussion.
The possibility of an involuntary termination of the privilege
of certifying to this class of statement seems to bother the critic.
“Tenure” is the word, I think, in England. Should an account
ant go unpunished if found guilty by a court of his peers of a
definite neglect of professional duty? Should the punishment be
the same for minor neglect as for major neglect? It was proposed
that temporary suspension of the privilege of doing this type of
work should follow conviction in the former case, and permanent
loss of licence to certify under the acts in the latter. If it seemed
better to use suspension for all cases of neglect, that is a variation
which ought not to be hard to compromise. Could not the ac
countancy court perform a distinct service if it were also given
authority to decide whether the evidence raised the presumption
of connivance by the auditor in the issue of a false financial state
ment or in the concealment of fraud in the accounts? Neglect of
full professional duties would be settled here, but if fraud seemed
in question, the issue should be referred to the regular law courts
for trial.
If an additional measure of professional independence were to
be secured, he would be a hardy man indeed who would object to
accepting definite liabilities as a quid pro quo, especially if they
were as mild and reasonable as the ones suggested. Is my in
dependence the freedom to do strictly as I please? Is professional
independence merely a proudly-held privilege of resigning from
the last engagement on the docket?
If the criticisms of Dr. Hunt were really directed, as they may
seem to be, at the personnel and objectives of the proposed board
of review or accountancy court, one could easily become con
cerned. If a court formed as outlined does in fact promise to
become “an inevitably mediocre bureaucracy,” then I can only
say that that dictum comes perilously close to containing an im
plied slander upon the men, who, being morally, intellectually
and professionally at the top of accountancy, would be the ones
eligible for appointment under this plan.
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But after all, that is just a dramatic phrase. The critic, I am
convinced, does not believe that there are no men in the profession
qualified for high responsibilities or that these men could not be
persuaded to serve their profession and the nation in such a way—
with or without “a not inconsiderable lure of fat pensions.” I
am persuaded that the thing which really agitates the critic,
though he does not succeed in making it very clear, is the con
nection which the plan seems to provide for tying the accountancy
court and practising accountants to the securities and exchange
commission. That is the only explanation I can see of the fear
expressed of a possible regimentation of accountants by a bureau
cracy of civil servants.
It is true that the original proposal spoke of auditors being
licensed under the securities and exchange commission. But
if it should be better, in the opinion of leaders of the profession,
that the accountancy court be set up first and qualified auditors
licensed by it to certify to the statements required by the securi
ties and exchange acts, that would be an acceptable modification
of the plan.
In another place in the original proposal it was suggested that
the auditor’s duties be outlined in general terms by regulations of
the securities and exchange commission. Perhaps it would be
better if the statute itself stated the auditor’s duty in broad terms,
such as:
1. To examine corporate records and accounts in order to judge
whether or not they consistently reflect the principles of good
accounting.
2. To scrutinize security contracts, examine proposals to change
the financial structure and study all financial valuations or opera
tions in order to judge whether the principles of sound finance
were being followed or not.
3. To follow up the accounting of new financing in order to see
if the use made of the funds was as stated in the prospectus.
4. To present and certify a full, clear statement of the present
financial condition, including a careful indication of the types of
security contracts outstanding.
5. To present a full, clear statement of income for the current
fiscal period as well as an analysis of past surplus and a certifica
tion of the earned income of the past three years.
With such a statute as the basic law, the accountancy court
would gradually establish precedents regarding auditors’ duties
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through its rulings on the cases brought before it. This approach
would dispense with the necessity for any regulations by the
securities and exchange commission regarding the technical duties
of auditors. No one, surely, need fear the trend of the rulings of
his peers in professional matters. Such a court would be better
prepared to comprehend the issues than one in which the per
sonnel was untrained in accounting. And it would probably be
easier to find accountants also educated in law (for nomination to
the court) than it is to find attorneys also educated in accounting
for places as judges in the regular law courts.
The original proposal also spoke of the accountancy court as
“an adjunct to the securities and exchange commission.” There
would, of course, be no objection to making it a companion body
rather than an adjunct—it would then be available to the com
mission as well as to others as a court on accounting matters.
There is no lack of precedent for such an arrangement. It is a
modernization of Lord Mansfield’s practice. When that jurist
was doing his great work of building the English mercantile
common law he made very effective use of men well versed by
long experience in the customs and accepted standards of trade.
The present securities and exchange commission has already
shown that it is disposed to consult with those in a position to
have special knowledge; and there seems no reason to believe that
such a disposition might not be extended in an organized way
through the submission of questions at issue to an established
accountancy court or board of review.
If the hypothesis is true that Dr. Hunt’s criticism relates
fundamentally to the way the original proposal seemed to tie
accountants tightly to the securities and exchange commission,
perhaps the modifications suggested above may meet that objec
tion. If the proposal as modified is an improvement over the
original, it has been made so by the criticism offered. If it is still
faulty, more discussion will be in order.
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